Freedom Line Blog

From today’s Washington Post distinguishing the Iraq troop surge from General McChrystal’s request for more ground forces in Afghanistan:

It’s important to remember that the crucial, lasting element of the surge in Iraq was not the influx of troops but getting Sunni tribes to switch sides, by offering them security, money and a place at the table. U.S. troops are now drawing down and yet – despite some violence – the Sunnis have not resumed fighting because Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is courting their support.”

So, according to Zakaria, courting Afghanistan’s Pashtuns will take the same kind of subsidies and sympathy extended to Iraq’s Sunnis. Fair enough. But how about that security thing? Does Zakaria really believe that – all other things being equal – applying only two of the three prongs of the Sunni pacification strategy to the Pashtuns will yeld exactly the same results? Especially when the prong he omits is the one that guarantees the persuasive effect of the other two? If there has been any lesson learned from America’s foreign policy dealings it is that nations – like individuals – need both carrots and sticks to inspire lasting changes.

We’ve seen this sort of reliance on “soft power” yield results before. Former President George W. Bush rode tractors with Vladimir Putin, looked into his soul, and then listened attentively as his buddy invaded and annexed a democratic country in neighboring Georgia. For over a decade State Departments under both Democrats and Republicans shipped consumer goods to North Korea while that country exploded nuclear bombs and fired rockets toward Hawaii. In both cases, the only defense for such subsidies is the active presence of American troops in Eastern Europe and South Korea. Take away the threat of an immediate response from the world’s premier fighting force and suddenly our subsidies become tribute; our sympathy, kowtowing.

Russia and North Korea understand this. So too do Iraq’s Sunni leaders. Are the Pashtuns any different?